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I. INTRODUCTION 
The decision in the Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento 
Integral v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción case1 [hereinafter 
Pemex] is the first US federal appellate decision to confirm a foreign 
Convention award that has been set aside at the seat. This issue of 
how to treat an arbitral award that has been annulled at the seat is one 
which most countries that are party to the New York and/or Panama 
Conventions also face. Thus, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
opinion and analysis in Pemex should be of interest not only to courts 
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1.  Corporacion Mexicana de Mant. v. Pemex-Exploracion, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016) 
[hereinafter Pemex II]. 
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in the United States, but also to courts in other countries that are 
parties to these Conventions. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
AWARDS SET ASIDE AT THE SEAT 
Although the New York and Panama Conventions compel 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, they also provide for 
certain exceptions. Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention2 is 
one of the grounds on which recognition and enforcement “may be 
refused” at the request of the party against whom it is invoked. The 
language of the New York Convention states that “the award has not 
yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended 
by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of 
which, that award was made.”3 However, as underscored by the 
permissive language, the Conventions do not appear to impose any 
obligation to refuse recognition or enforcement to an annulled award. 
Thus, the Conventions themselves seem to leave a country free to 
enforce an award set aside in the country where the award was 
rendered. 
Broadly speaking, courts faced with an award that has been set 
aside at the seat take one of three approaches: (1) treat the award as a 
nullity, with the result that there is nothing to enforce; (2) effectively 
ignore the set-aside, on the view that courts in each Convention 
country can make an independent decision about the validity of the 
award under its own standards; or (3) give some degree of deference 
to the set-aside decision, while reserving the ability to enforce the 
award notwithstanding the set-aside if justified under the 
circumstances. 
A country that treats an award set aside at the seat as no award at 
all—because it finds nothing to recognize or enforce—views 
arbitration as an extension of the legal regime of the country in which 
                                                                                              
2.  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 6, 
1958 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention], art. V(1)(e). 
Article 5(1)(e) in the Panama Convention has a similar ground. See Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama City, 1975) [hereinafter The 
Panama Convention], art. 5(1)(e). 
3. The Panama Convention has similar language: “The decision is not yet binding on the 
parties or has been annulled or suspended by a competent authority of the State in which, or 
according to the law of which, the decision has been made.” The Panama Convention, supra 
note 2, at art. 5(1)(e).  
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the arbitration takes place. Thus, it is appropriate that the potential 
enforcing court cede to the court at the place of arbitration complete 
oversight and conclusive control over the award.4 Because the parties 
have consciously chosen to arbitrate at that particular place, the 
parties can be said to expect exposure to a potential set-aside by the 
courts of that jurisdiction. Many countries—including Russia, Chile, 
Germany, and other (predominantly civil law) jurisdictions—have 
adopted this approach.5 
A few countries, most notably France, take a diametrically 
opposed view. French arbitration law, in both its prior and present 
version, eliminates the Article V(1)(e) ground in the New York 
Convention as a basis for non-recognition.6 The French view is that 
international arbitration is part of a transnational legal order and is not 
attached to any national legal regime. Thus, an award annulled at the 
seat of arbitration may still be fully enforceable in France, barring any 
other Convention ground justifying non-enforcement as a matter of 
French domestic law. Of course, the refusal to give effect to a set-
aside does not mean that France necessarily enforces all awards. For 
example, in the Thai-Lao Co. v. Government of Laos case,7 the Paris 
Court of Appeal refused to enforce an award set aside at the seat in 
Malaysia, but did so on the basis of its own independent review of the 
award under French law, invoking the ground of “excess of 
jurisdiction,” which is a basis for non-recognition under French law. 
                                                                                              
4. Especially in the US literature, the seat is often referred to as the “primary 
jurisdiction,” while any jurisdiction in which recognition and enforcement is sought is called a 
“secondary jurisdiction.” See generally Alan Scott Rau, Understanding (and 
Misunderstanding) “Primary Jurisdiction”, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 47 (2010). 
5. In some of these countries, there may be alternative mechanisms for enforcing the 
award. Under Article VII of the New York Convention, courts may nonetheless find 
alternative mechanisms to enforce the award. Article VII of the New York Convention permits 
parties to rely on laws or treaties in the enforcing court that would permit recognition or 
enforcement of the award on terms more favorable than what is required by the Convention. 
See New York Convention, supra note 2. For example, for countries party to the 1961 
European Convention, Article IX(1) provides that a decision setting aside an award at the seat 
“shall only constitute a ground for the refusal of recognition” if the set-aside was based on the 
specific grounds enumerated in Articles V(1)(a)–(d), with the effect of excluding non-
arbitrability or public policy under the law at the seat as reasons for refusing recognition and 
enforcement. See European Convention, art. IX(1); see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 3623 (2d ed. 2014). 
6. CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] arts. 1525, 1520 (Fr.). An English translation of 
the law is available at: http://www.iaiparis.com/pdf/FRENCH_LAW_ON_
ARBITRATION.pdf. 
7. See Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
997 F. Supp. 2d 214, 227 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (discussing Paris Court of Appeal decision). 
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Among the most undesirable consequences of the French approach of 
disregarding annulment at the seat is that it can lead to inconsistent 
awards. The reason for the inconsistency is that a second award may 
be issued by a tribunal at the seat of arbitration subsequent to the 
annulment, as was the case in both the Hilmarton and in Putrabali 
cases.8 
As for the United States, courts have taken something of a 
middle path, appearing to follow a more discretionary approach in 
assessing whether to enforce an annulled award. However, it has been 
difficult to identify with any precision the standard that the courts in 
the United States have adopted. In Baker Marine v. Chevron, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that it would enforce 
an annulled award only if there were “adequate reasons for refusing to 
recognize the set-aside judgments of the Nigerian court” and 
concluded that this was not the case on the facts before it.9 In 
TermoRio v. Electranta, the Court of Appeals for the District Court of 
Columbia appeared to set a higher threshold in refusing to enforce a 
Colombian award set aside in Colombia.10 The ground for the set-
aside was that the arbitration clause selecting ICC Rules was a 
violation of Colombian law. Stating that a foreign set-aside judgment 
should be respected unless it was “repugnant to fundamental notions 
of what is decent and just in the state where enforcement is sought,” 
the court indicated that United States courts should not go behind a 
foreign court’s nullification of an award “absent extraordinary 
circumstances” and emphasized the narrowness of any “public 
policy” exception.11 The D.C. Court of Appeals distinguished an 
earlier D.C. district court case, Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt,12 which enforced an award that had been set aside 
                                                                                              
8. Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation v. Hilmarton, Cour de Cassation [Cass. 1e 
civ.] June 10, 1997, Revue de l’Arbitrage 376 (1997) (Fr.); PT Putrabali Adyamulia v. Rena 
Holding, Ltd., Cour de Cassation [Cass. 1e civ.] June 29, 2007, XXXII Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration 299, 302 (2007). 
9. Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1999). 
10. TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
11. Id. at 937-38. It is worth noting that the relationship between the “adequate reason” 
test and the “extraordinary circumstances” test is not entirely clear. TermoRio states that Baker 
Marine is “consistent with” the extraordinary circumstances approach. Id. at 938. However, on 
its face the language in Baker Marine would seem to suggest a lower threshold for enforcing 
an award that has been set aside at the seat. 
12. Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 
1996). 
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at the seat, as one in which the defendant Egypt had breached its 
agreement not to file an appeal to nullify the award. 
III. PEMEX: A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE UNITED STATES? 
In Pemex, the district court enforced an arbitral award in favor of 
COMMISA—a Mexican subsidiary of KBR, a US corporation— 
against the Mexican-state owned petroleum company Pemex, even 
though the award had been set aside by a court at the Mexican seat.13 
The underlying dispute arose when contractual disagreements led to 
Pemex seizing oil platforms that COMMISA had been working on, 
and then administratively rescinding the contracts Pemex had with 
COMMISA. COMMISA brought an ICC arbitration in December of 
2004. Pemex participated in the arbitration but challenged the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguing that the rescission constituted an “act 
of authority” and was therefore not arbitrable. The tribunal rejected 
the argument. In 2009—prior to the rendering of the award14—
Section 98 of the Law of Public Works and Related Services came 
into effect, which provided that rescissions of government contracts 
“may not be subject to arbitration proceedings.”15 Exclusive 
jurisdiction was vested in the administrative courts of Mexico, and 
any judicial adjudication of public contract disputes was changed 
from 10 years to 45 days. The tribunal issued its award, finding 
Pemex liable and awarding COMMISA approximately US$300 
million in damages. One arbitrator dissented on the ground that 
Section 98 of the Mexican law barred the action.16 
Shortly thereafter, COMMISA sought to confirm the award 
under the Panama Convention in the New York federal district court. 
Pemex moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and also 
moved to set aside the award in Mexico and to stay the New York 
proceedings. The federal district court denied the stay and confirmed 
                                                                                              
13. Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S.De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex 
Exploracion Y Produccion, 962 F.Supp. 2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter Pemex I]. 
14. The award was rendered on December 19, 2009; the legislation came into effect on 
May 28, 2009. See Pemex I, supra note 13, at 648. There is usually an interval of several 
months between the close of the hearings and the issuance of the award, so it is not clear 
whether or to what extent the new law was addressed during the course of the hearings. 
15. See Law of Public Works and Related Services, § 98 (Mex.) (effective May 28, 
2009). 
16. Pemex I, supra note 13, at 648. The dissenting arbitrator also argued that res judicata 
barred the action in light of a related amparo proceeding, but the res judicata issue was not 
taken up by the US court. Id. 
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the award in August 2010. While the case was on appeal to the 
Second Circuit, the Mexican court (the Eleventh Collegiate Court) 
annulled the award on the ground that arbitration of the dispute was 
non-arbitrable and against Mexican public policy. The Mexican court 
relied not only on the new law (Section 98), but also on a 1994 
judgment of the Mexican Supreme Court that discussed 
administrative rescission of contracts, but without any reference to 
arbitration or arbitrability. On the basis of the set-aside, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case in order that the district 
court could reconsider its decision in light of the Mexican set-aside. 
On remand, the district court again confirmed the award, 
“declin[ing] to defer to the Eleventh Collegiate Court’s ruling.”17 Its 
judgment was based on the conclusion that the Mexican court set-
aside judgment violated basic notions of justice by applying a 
retroactive prohibition on arbitrability and leaving the plaintiff with 
no remedy.18 Key to the district court’s ruling was a determination 
that the Eleventh Collegiate Court—despite that Court’s statements 
directly to the contrary—did not actually reach the result it did based 
solely on the 1994 judgment, but that it had instead relied on Section 
98.19 Particularly troubling to the court was the fact that Section 98 
established a 45-day time limitations period for filing claims 
regarding administrative rescission in the designated court, which 
meant that the period in which COMMISA could file a claim had 
already elapsed by the time the Eleventh Collegiate Court judgment 
came down.20 
Pemex appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court in an opinion that conceivably 
adopts a new framework for recognition of an arbitral award in the 
aftermath of a set-aside. 21 Rather than starting with the earlier 
standard espoused in Baker Marine—that enforcement of a set-aside 
award is inappropriate absent an “adequate reason”—or the 
potentially stricter “extraordinary circumstances” formulation from 
TermoRio, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit framed its 
                                                                                              
17. Id. at 644. 
18. Id. at 657. 
19. Id. at 659 (“Based on the Eleventh Collegiate Court’s extensive discussion of Section 
98, it was this law, not the 1994 Mexican Supreme Court decision, that was critical to its 
decision.”). 
20. Id. at 652. The limitations period ran from the date of the rescission, in 2004. 
21. Pemex II, supra note 1. 
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discussion around the concept of comity, with specific reference to 
the law on recognition of judgments. It began by describing the 
district court decision to enforce the award despite the set-aside as a 
“denial of comity” to the Mexican judgment—a formulation that the 
district court had never itself used.22 Nonetheless, it affirmed the 
district court’s confirmation of the award. Citing a series of cases 
from the judgment recognition context, the Court of Appeals stated 
that foreign judgments are “generally conclusive”—as a matter of 
comity—except where recognition and enforcement “would offend 
the public policy of the state in which enforcement is sought.”23 The 
Court of Appeals drew particularly heavily from Ackermann v. 
Levine, a case decided under New York’s version of the Uniform 
Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act.24 Indeed, in the 
single paragraph devoted to the content of the public policy standard 
itself, the court simply distilled a key passage from Ackermann as 
follows: 
The public policy exception does not swallow the rule: the 
standard is high, and infrequently met; a judgment that tends 
clearly to undermine the public interest, the public confidence in 
the administration of the law, or security for individual rights of 
personal liberty or of private property is against public policy. 
The exception accommodates uneasily two competing (and 
equally important) principles: [i] the goals of comity and res 
judicata that underlie the doctrine of recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments and [ii] fairness to litigants.25 
Notwithstanding that it relied primarily on cases from the 
judgment recognition context, the Court of Appeals stated that 
TermoRio and Baker Marine “endorsed this approach.”26 That 
statement may be somewhat of a reach. Baker Marine never cited to 
any judgment recognition cases, although it did say that there were 
                                                                                              
22. Pemex II, supra note 1, at 100. 
23. Id. at 105–06 (citing Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 
F.3d 850, 854 (2d Cir. 1997); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 837 (2d Cir. 1986); and 
Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971)). 
24. Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986). Notably, the practice 
commentaries to the UFCMJRA as incorporated into the CPLR state, “Article 53 only 
incorporates a portion of New York’s comity case law into statute: specifically, that involving 
money judgments.” N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5301 (McKinney 2017), C5301:1. Recognition of Foreign 
Country Money Judgments, Generally (Richard C. Reilly, ed.) (emphasis in original). 
25. Pemex II, supra note 1, at 106, (quoting Ackermann, supra note 24, at 841-42). 
26. Id. 
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“no adequate reasons for refusing to recognize the judgments of the 
Nigeria court,” and it mentioned “public policy” only in passing in a 
footnote. TermoRio, which did engage in a more fulsome discussion 
of public policy, disclaimed that US courts have “unfettered 
discretion to impose [their] own considerations of public policy.”27 
Moreover, the Second Circuit’s application of public policy to 
the facts of the case is not particularly illuminating. The Court of 
Appeals cited four considerations in support of its conclusion that the 
set-aside judgment by the Mexican court contravened US public 
policy: (1) that it violates a contractual waiver of sovereign immunity; 
(2) that it amounts to retroactive application of the law which 
disrupted contractual undertakings; (3) that it deprives COMMISA of 
a forum; and (4) that it amounts to government expropriation without 
compensation.28 Each of these factors merits further inquiry.  The 
concern about violating the contractual immunity waiver and the 
reference to expropriation without compensation in particular raise 
questions. The first suggests that courts at the seat may not review 
whether an arbitral tribunal properly exercised jurisdiction over the 
dispute, which is surely not the case. The concern about expropriation 
looked to the US Constitution’s “Takings” doctrine and to NAFTA’s 
provision on expropriation, but there is no discussion of how these 
sources, as applied to the enforcement of the award in this case, 
would violate U.S. public policy. 
The second and third grounds are stronger, but they too raise 
questions. First, it is an open issue as to whether an enforcing court 
should review a foreign set-aside judgment for substantive as well as 
procedural defects. And even assuming substantive concerns are an 
appropriate subject of inquiry, retroactive legislation is not always 
prohibited or against public policy—even in the United States—
although it is certainly “disfavored.”29 Second, comity might suggest 
                                                                                              
27. TermoRio, supra note 10, at 251–52. 
28. Pemex II, supra note 1, at 107–11. 
29. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (“[T]he presumption 
against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence and embodies a legal 
doctrine centuries older than our Republic.”). Yet it is important to note that the presumption 
against retroactive legislation is a rule of statutory interpretation: Congress may be able to pass 
a retroactive law—subject to certain constitutional questions about retroactive legislation—but 
it must indicate clearly that the law is to have retroactive effect. In the Pemex dispute, Section 
98 “did not address whether it applied to administrative rescissions that were issued prior to its 
enactment.” Pemex I, supra note 13, at 648. Of course, even if Section 98’s silence regarding 
retroactive application means a US court would apply the Landgraf presumption—and even if 
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that an enforcing court should not be second-guessing a foreign court 
on the determination of its own law. Although TermoRio stated that a 
“narrow public policy gloss on Article V(1)(e)” could provide for 
enforcement of set-aside awards, nonetheless it noted various limits to 
US courts’ invocation of public policy; it specifically disclaimed that 
“a court in the United States has unfettered discretion to impose its 
own considerations of public policy” especially where that involves 
“reviewing . . . the foreign court’s construction of the law of the 
[seat].”30 In the district court decision in Pemex, Judge Hellerstein 
also signaled his awareness of the need for caution in engaging in 
substantive review of foreign judgments when he wrote: “In declining 
to defer to the Eleventh Collegiate Court, I am neither deciding, nor 
reviewing, Mexican law. I base my decision not on the substantive 
merit of a particular Mexican law, but on its application to events that 
occurred before that law’s adoption.”31 Nonetheless, it is clear that 
that the district court did make its own determination about the actual 
ground for the Mexican court’s set-aside decision that contradicted 
the ground on which the Mexican court purported to base its 
decision.32 Whatever the merits of the district court’s conclusion, its 
disagreement with the foreign court’s reasoning does raise sensitive 
issues of international comity. In a somewhat different context, the 
Second Circuit recently invoked comity and refused to looking behind 
the law of a foreign state to inquire into motive or reasoning.33 In 
Pemex, however, the Second Circuit appeared to agree with the 
district court’s determination that the Mexican court had not 
genuinely relied on the 1994 Mexican judgment and had instead 
                                                                                              
that presumption reflects public policy—it is another matter altogether to say that a foreign 
judgment setting aside an award violates US public policy for failing to apply that same 
statutory presumption. 
30. TermoRio, supra note 10, at 251–52. 
31. Pemex I, supra note 13, at 661. 
32. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
33. In In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016), the defendants 
(Chinese corporations) formed a cartel to fix the price of vitamin C exported to the United 
States in violation of US antitrust law. Rather than deny the allegations, defendants argued that 
Chinese law required them to coordinate export prices. Despite evidence that the defendants 
had specifically asked the Chinese government to fix their prices, perhaps in a move to avoid 
liability in the United States, the Second Circuit credited the defense and dismissed the case on 
the ground of international comity. The case is noteworthy because it marked the first time a 
ministry of the Chinese government appeared in a US proceeding as amicus curiae. See id. at 
180, n.5. 
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based its decision on § 98,34 stating “we do not think that the Southern 
District second-guessed the Eleventh Collegiate Court, which appears 
only to have been implementing the law of Mexico.”35 Finally, the 
concern about lack of access to any other forum for resolution of the 
dispute may be the most compelling reason the Court offered to 
justify ignoring the set-aside. Pemex’s response was that COMMISA 
had been told early on to bring an action in the Mexican courts to 
challenge the rescission, and thus the lack of remedy was the result of 
its own strategic choice. 
An even more troubling aspect of the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Pemex is its use of an “abuse of discretion” standard for review of 
the district court judgment. The court stated that the “unfettered 
discretion of a district court to enforce an arbitral award annulled in 
the awarding jurisdiction” was “constrained” only by “international 
comity.”36 Despite the fact that neither appellate court in TermoRio or 
Baker Marine used an abuse of discretion standard, the Court of 
Appeals in Pemex devoted no analysis to this point. The district court 
in Pemex properly viewed TermoRio and Baker Marine as holding 
that a court has only “narrow discretion” to confirm an award that has 
been set aside by a competent court.37 But that discretion is the 
                                                                                              
34. See Pemex II, supra note 1, at 109 (“One of PEP’s own witnesses, in the evidentiary 
hearing before the Southern District, testified that the 1994 decision was a ‘weak premise’ for 
the Eleventh Collegiate Court to rely upon. . . . It is therefore unsurprising that the opinion of 
the Eleventh Collegiate Court relies heavily on Section 98 and very little on the Mexican 
Supreme Court decision.”). 
35. Id. at 111. The claim that the district court did not second guess the Eleventh 
Collegiate Court is not entirely convincing. The district court said, “it was [§ 98], not the 1994 
Mexican Supreme Court decision, that was critical to [the Eleventh Collegiate Court’s] 
decision.” Pemex I, supra note 13, at 659. However, the Eleventh Collegiate Court purportedly 
relied at least in part on case law that predated Section 98. Thus, the Second Circuit’s 
conclusion that the US enforcement decision did not contradict the Mexican set-aside decision 
on what was effectively a point of Mexican law is not illuminating. Perhaps it would have 
been preferable for the Court of Appeals to directly confront the question of when the 
deference typically owed to a court at the seat when interpreting its own law is outweighed by 
other considerations. 
36. Id. at 106. Interestingly, as authority for the proposition that “we review a district 
court’s decision to extend or deny comity to a foreign proceeding for abuse of discretion,” 
Pemex cited Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999), a 
case that involved dismissing a US debt collection suit in favor of a Brazilian bankruptcy 
proceeding, in which the US defendant’s assets were being liquidated, on the grounds of 
international comity. 
37. Pemex I, supra note 13, at 657. (The district court referenced Article 5 of the Panama 
Convention, as implemented by the FAA [Chapter 3] and stated: “The statutory phrase, ‘may,’ 
gives me discretion but, it appears from [TermoRio and Baker Marine], a narrow discretion.”). 
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discretion provided by the “may refuse” language of the New York 
and Panama Conventions and refers to the discretion that a country 
has in determining how to deal with a set-aside. It does not and should 
not address the allocation of decision-making between the district and 
appellate court. Similarly, “abuse of discretion” is not the applicable 
standard of review of a lower court’s ruling in the context of 
judgment recognition, which is generally said to be “de novo.”38 Use 
of “de novo” review is necessary to develop consistent standards in an 
area that requires predictability and uniformity. 
Nonetheless, the adoption by the Court of Appeals in Pemex of a 
“judgments framework” as the means to evaluate a set-aside is 
desirable and provides criteria and guidance for such assessments.39 A 
similar standard for treating set-asides has been articulated in the 
2012 Draft of the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law 
Third on International Commercial Arbitration: Section 4-16(b) of the 
Draft provides that a court in the United States may confirm, 
recognize, or enforce an award that has been set aside by a competent 
authority “if the judgment setting it aside is not entitled to recognition 
under the principles governing the recognition of judgments in the 
court where such relief is sought, or in other extraordinary 
circumstances.”40 
A few courts elsewhere appear to have engaged in a similar 
analysis. In the Yukos Capital Sarl v. Rosneft case,41 the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeal enforced an award that was set aside by the Russian 
                                                                                              
38. DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 804 F.3d 373, 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2486, 195 L. Ed. 2d 822 (2016) (“Whether the judgment debtor established 
that one of these non-recognition provisions applies is a question of law reviewed de novo.”). 
DeJoria, in which recognition was sought under Texas’s Uniform Foreign Country Money–
Judgment Recognition Act, noted that it used de novo review because that was the standard 
under state law. Although not entirely analogous, the Second Circuit has employed de novo 
review when a lower court grants summary judgment on a judgment recognition question. 
SerVaas Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 540 F. App’x 38, 40 (2d Cir. 2013). The same standard of 
review should be applied in the award recognition context. 
39. See generally Linda Silberman & Maxi Scherer, Forum Shopping and Post-Award 
Judgments, in FORUM SHOPPING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
CONTEXT 313–45 (Franco Ferrari, ed., 2013). See also William W. Park, Duty and Discretion 
in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. OF INT. L. 805 (1999); Linda J. Silberman, The New 
York Convention After Fifty Years: Some Reflections on the Role of National Law, 38 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 25, 32–36 (2009). 
40. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Third), The U.S. Law of 
International Commercial Arbitration, Tentative Draft No. 2 § 4-16 (Apr. 16, 2012). 
41. Yukos Capital Sarl v. OAO Rosneft, Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Apr. 28, 2009 
(Neth.), XXXIV Y.B. COMM. ARB. 703 (2009). 
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courts, concluding that the Russian set-aside was a foreign judgment 
rendered by a judicial body that lacked impartiality and independence 
and thus should not be recognized. The Dutch Yukos case was 
probably an “easy” case for a “judgments approach” because the need 
for impartial tribunals and fairness of proceedings is a universal 
ground for non-recognition of a judgment. “Public policy” is also a 
ground for non-recognition of foreign judgments, but that is a more 
amorphous standard, and was recognized as such by the Court of 
Appeals in Pemex, which cautioned that invocations of public policy 
must be limited and therefore require a high hurdle. Although it may 
be questioned whether the “public policy” exception should be 
limited to “process” defects in the set-aside court, as in Yukos, or can 
also include substantive matters such as retroactivity, substantive 
standards of “decency and justice” are often invoked in traditional 
judgment-recognition cases. Thus, such standards, along with 
acceptable practices in international arbitration, can and should 
properly inform public policy in this context. 
One need not go as far as the late Professor Hans Smit, who 
proposed that all annulments be presumptively disregarded in cases 
where the set-aside had taken place in the “home court” of one of the 
parties, and at its request,42 but concerns about local bias and 
parochialism at the situs cannot be entirely disregarded where a state-
owned entity is involved and that state was the only realistic place of 
arbitration. The late Andreas Lowenfeld, Professor Silberman’s 
colleague at NYU, thought set-asides should not be respected if they 
were “fishy.” In our view, “fishy” is not a legal standard that one that 
can define or legitimately invoke, and although the “judgments 
approach” has its limitations, it is a substantial improvement over 
“fishy” or mere “discretion.” 
Further word on the propriety of a “judgments approach” will 
have to await another case.   Although Pemex filed a petition for 
certiorari in the Supreme Court challenging both the standard applied 
by the Second Circuit and what it characterized as the US court’s 
inappropriate inquiry into the Mexican set-aside decision, the case 
ultimately settled.43 It is worth keeping an eye on another set-
                                                                                              
42. See Hans Smit, Annulment and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: A 
Practical Perspective, 18 AM. REV. OF INT’L ARB. 297, 304 (2007). 
43. KBR Resolves Decade Long Despite in Mexico, OFFSHORE ENERGY TODAY (10 
April 2017), available at http://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/kbr-resolves-decade-long-
dispute-in-mexico-collects-435-million/. The petition for certiorari also raised two additional 
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aside/recognition case pending in the Second Circuit. In Thai-Lao 
Lignite v. the Government of Laos, a district court in New York 
refused to enforce an award in favor of a Thai company against the 
Government of Laos after it had been set aside by a court seated in 
Malaysia.44 Thai-Lao has a peculiar twist because the district court 
had previously confirmed the award—a decision that was affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.45 After the confirmation 
action in the United States, the Government of Laos successfully 
challenged the award in Malaysia. The ground for the set-aside in 
Malaysia was that the arbitral tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by 
extending the agreement to reach non-parties and claims related to 
other contracts. The Government of Laos filed to have the case re-
opened in light of the set-aside,46 and by the time the district court 
issued its decision, the district decision in Pemex had just been 
rendered. In distinguishing Thai-Lao from Pemex, the district judge 
pointed out that the set-aside judgment in Thai-Lao was in a neutral 
country and did not involve any entity of the State of the seat. It is 
also the case that the ground for set-aside in Malaysia was the 
equivalent of a New York Convention defense whereas the ground in 
Mexico was arguably a “local” arbitrability issue favorable to the 
state entity. Finally, unlike in Pemex, the Malaysian High Court 
                                                                                              
points. First, Pemex challenged the augmentation of the award at the enforcement stage by the 
district court and the Second Circuit by ordering Pemex to pay COMMISA US$ 
106 million over what the arbitrators awarded, as compensation for performance bonds 
Pemex collected after the award issued. Second, Pemex argued that the district court had no 
personal jurisdiction over it and thus could not entertain an action to confirm the award. The 
Court of Appeals did not expressly address the question of whether §1605(a)(6) the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), which provides an exception for immunity where “the 
agreement or award is (or may be) governed by a treaty or international agreement in force for 
the United States which calls for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards,” also 
provides a constitutional basis for jurisdiction. The panel majority held that when Pemex 
sought remand for reconsideration in light of the set aside, it forfeited its personal jurisdiction 
defense, despite timely raising, fully briefing and arguing the point. Pemex II, supra note 1, at 
101. One judge dissented on the “forfeiture” point. In any event, the full panel agreed that 
Pemex, although formally a foreign corporation, was to be treated as the foreign sovereign 
itself and thus was not entitled to Due Process protection. Pemex II, supra note 1, at 102–03. 
44. See Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
997 F. Supp. 2d 214, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
45. Thai–Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, 2011 WL 3516154, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011) (Wood, J.), aff’d, 492 F. App’x 150 
(2d. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1473 (Feb. 21, 2013). 
46. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). 
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decision did not leave the losing party without a remedy, as it merely 
ordered re-arbitration before a different panel of arbitrators.47 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Pemex case may have signaled a new approach for the 
United States to the recognition of awards that have been set aside at 
the seat. The move toward a judgments approach is a welcome 
development in providing a framework by which to evaluate the set-
aside of a foreign Convention award. However, the Pemex opinion is 
not entirely satisfactory. To the extent a court will engage in review 
of both substantive and procedural defects in the foreign set-aside 
judgment, comity would seem to require some deference to the 
foreign judgment when the foreign court is interpreting its own law. It 
is unclear whether the Second Circuit provided that deference in the 
instant case. Also, the invocation of an “abuse of discretion” standard 
to review the district court’s ruling to disregard the foreign set-aside 
seems wrong and threatens to undermine uniformity and consistency 
at the recognition stage and potentially erodes the supervisory 
authority of courts at the seat. The need for some inquiry into the 
basis of the foreign set-aside does seem appropriate, but further 
development of the issues we have raised will nonetheless be 
necessary to make that approach effective and acceptable. 
                                                                                              
47. See Thai-Lao, supra note 44, at 227. 
